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After Nehru, What? Britain, the United States, and the Other Transfer
of Power in India, 1960–64
Paul M. McGarr*
In November 1959, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, turned seventy.
Having led his country since Britain’s departure from South Asia in August 1947,
Nehru’s seventieth birthday stimulated debates, both inside and outside the
Indian subcontinent, on India’s future in a post-Nehruvian world. In the early
1960s, with the Indian premier’s health deteriorating and Sino-Indian relations
under strain, British and US policymakers evidenced increasing concern with
whom, or perhaps more pertinently, with what, forces would govern the world’s
largest democracy after Nehru. This article, which draws upon recently released
British and US archival records, provides the ﬁrst assessment of Western
involvement in the struggle to succeed Nehru which occurred within India’s ruling
Congress Party between 1960 and 1964. Moreover, it oﬀers insights into Anglo-
American concern that Nehru’s health adversely aﬀected Indian policymaking;
the involvement of foreign intelligence services in India’s domestic politics; and
the misplaced expectations of British and US oﬃcials that the appointment of Lal
Bahadur Shastri as India’s second Prime Minister, in May 1964, would herald the
beginning of a new and more productive relationship between India and the West.
Keywords: India; Nehru; Shastri; Anglo-American
On 26 May 1964, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, worked late into the
night in his New Delhi residence, Teen Murti Bhavan, clearing pending papers and
dealing with outstanding correspondence. The following morning, a member of
Nehru’s staﬀ discovered the Indian premier lying unconscious on his bedroom ﬂoor
in a pool of blood. Frantic medical eﬀorts to stem the bleeding from a ruptured aorta
in Nehru’s stomach failed, and later that day the ﬁrst, and at that time only leader
that independent India had known, was pronounced dead.1 As news of Nehru’s
death spread across India, the country came to a standstill. Government oﬃces
closed, shops pulled down their shutters, and twelve days of state mourning began.
In New York, debate in the United Nations Security Council was suspended as a
mark of respect. Back in New Delhi, 50,000 Indians ﬂocked to the Prime Minister’s
home to ﬁle slowly past his funeral bier. Asked to comment on Nehru’s passing, a
spokesman for the Indian High Commission in London stated simply: ‘For us it is
like the shattering of the Himalayas.’2
Jawaharlal Nehru accumulated a formidable amount of political power after the
British left India in August 1947. In addition to his prime-ministerial responsibilities,
Nehru managed India’s external-aﬀairs portfolio, led its economic-planning
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commission, ran the country’s atomic-energy programme and chaired the ruling
Congress Party’s Working Committee. Moreover, after the death in December 1950
of India’s Home Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru
was without a substantive political rival. In 1958, the Indian leader’s omnipotence
prompted Britain’s High Commissioner to India, Malcolm MacDonald, to observe
that, ‘. . .Mr. Nehru has hitherto exerted unchallenged and almost unqualiﬁed
personal authority [in India]. In fact, Indian democracy already possesses some of
the features of a typical Asian autocracy.’3
Nehru’s death in May 1964 came after his health had been in decline for some
time, and was not unexpected. Nonetheless, it was greeted with considerable unease,
both in India and abroad. ‘A sense of crisis has been growing in India,’ The Times
had noted the previous January. ‘It is not so much a nervous or hysterical sense as
the recognition that one era is passing and another, whose outlines are still
undeﬁned, will soon be following.’4 In fact, as early as November 1959, the arrival of
Nehru’s seventieth birthday had ampliﬁed debates over whether India’s Prime
Minister should step down from oﬃce, and who should succeed him when he did.5
Furthermore, by the turn of the decade, as Nehru’s health faltered and his grip on
power weakened, British and US policymakers became increasingly concerned not
only with whom, but perhaps more pertinently, with what forces, would shape the
future of the world’s largest democracy.6
Jawaharlal Nehru’s life and work has received considerable attention.7 Existing
scholarship, however, has approached important questions surrounding the end of
Nehru’s life from a predominately Indian perspective. Much focus, for example, has
been placed upon the jockeying for power which occurred within the ranks of the
ruling Congress Party toward the end of Nehru’s premiership.8 Surprisingly little
consideration has been given to the international dimension of the second ‘transfer
of power’ in India, in the spring of 1964. Likewise, the substantial body of literature
addressing US, and to a lesser extent British relations with independent India, largely
obscures the signiﬁcance which Anglo-American policymakers placed on Nehru’s
passing. Notably, an analysis of Anglo-American intervention in the succession
process, is either omitted from, or falls outside the scope of, the path-breaking
studies of post-war US and British policy in South Asia, produced by Robert J.
McMahon and Anita Inder Singh.9
This lacuna in the history of Anglo-American relations with India is all the more
surprising, given the strategic importance which Britain and the United States
attached to South Asia between the late 1950s and the early 1960s. As the head of a
Commonwealth of Nations which included India, and its neighbour, Pakistan,
Whitehall retained a signiﬁcant political interest in the Indian subcontinent after 1947.
In addition, the British supplied India’s armed forces with the bulk of its training and
equipment throughout the 1950s, were formally allied to Pakistan via the Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
security pacts, and from a ﬁnancial standpoint, remained the region’s principal trading
partner.10 In short, Britain’s stake in South Asia was considerable. At the same time, in
the United States, the Eisenhower administration, which had concluded a separate
mutual defence pact with Pakistan in 1954, became concerned at India’s vulnerability
to the forces of communism. In 1957, Washington looked on with alarm as the
Communist Party of India was voted into power in the southern Indian state of
Kerala. Likewise, whilst Indo-Soviet relations blossomed around the turn of the
decade, India’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were embittered
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by a border dispute.11 Both Eisenhower, and his successor in theWhite House, John F.
Kennedy, believed that a prosperous and democratic India could serve as a
counterweight to communist expansion in the developing world. In consequence,
from 1958, the United States provided India with increasing amounts of economic aid
and political support.12 Indeed, for a brief period at the beginning of the 1960s, and in
particular following the Sino-Indian border war of late 1962, the United States’ eﬀort
to contain Asian communism was centred not in South Vietnam, but in India.13
This article breaks new ground by drawing upon a wide range of sources,
including recently declassiﬁed records from archives in both the United Kingdom
and the United States, to provide the ﬁrst systematic look at Anglo-American
reactions to the passing of Nehruvian India between 1960 and 1964. Above all, it
clariﬁes why British and US policymakers approached the process of political
transition on the Indian subcontinent as both a threat to international security, and
paradoxically, as a timely opportunity for reinvigorating India’s relationship with
the West. In the process, fresh light is thrown on Anglo-American concern that
Nehru’s health adversely aﬀected Indian policymaking; the involvement of foreign
intelligence services in India’s domestic politics; and the rationale underpinning
decisions taken in London and Washington to back Lal Bahadur Shastri as Nehru’s
successor.
In the early 1960s, Anglo-American policymakers interpreted India through the
prism of Jawaharlal Nehru. This was, perhaps, unsurprising given Nehru’s longevity
as India’s leader, and his dominant inﬂuence over the subcontinent’s political
landscape. A propensity to conﬂate Nehru with India, and India with Nehru,
however, led Britain and the United States to exaggerate the threats that India faced
in a post-Nehruvian world. More importantly, such thinking encouraged British and
US oﬃcials to overestimate the propensity, or indeed, the capacity, of Nehru’s
successor to redeﬁne India’s foreign policy. Having worked to smooth Lal Bahadur
Shastri’s path to power, once in oﬃce, India’s second Prime Minister disappointed
Anglo-American leaders. In June 1964, America’s Ambassador in New Delhi,
Chester Bowles, asserted conﬁdently that he expected India’s new premier would
prove, ‘. . . internationally as well as domestically suspicious of [the] Soviet Union,
desirous of better relations with Pakistan and friendly to us.’14 In fact, by the end of
1965, precisely the opposite applied.
I.
In the 1950s, as nascent Afro-Asian leaders decried Western imperialism and ﬂirted
with communism, for all his anti-colonial bluster and socialist rhetoric, Jawaharlal
Nehru’s democratic credentials and advocacy of cold-war non-alignment reassured
Anglo-American oﬃcials.15 Within the corridors of Washington and Whitehall,
India’s Prime Minister was seen as a product of the British imperial system.
Educated at Harrow, Trinity College, Cambridge, and London’s Inner Temple,
toward the end of his life Nehru himself reﬂected sardonically that he would be
remembered as, ‘the last Englishman to rule in India’.16 At the time, it seemed that
Nehru would continue to discharge his prime ministerial responsibilities well into the
future. Although over seventy, the Indian leader appeared to have lost none of his
vitality, and maintained a punishing work schedule. In 1960, Malcolm MacDonald
observed that Nehru’s, ‘body looked as trim as an athlete’s, his step was light and
energetic, and his mind stayed delightfully fresh’.17
The International History Review 117
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
2.2
3.1
62
.18
9]
 at
 04
:33
 11
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
A year later, as he prepared to welcome Nehru to the United States, President
Kennedy was assured by his oﬃcials that the ageing Indian premier’s, ‘power and
presence remains basically undiminished’.18 In January 1961, Kennedy had been
propelled into the White House on the back of a campaign which contrasted the
energy and dynamism of his ‘New Frontier’ politics, with the lassitude of an
outgoing Republican administration headed by the septuagenarian Eisenhower.19
Eagerly anticipating his encounter with Nehru, Kennedy was shocked to ﬁnd the
Indian Prime Minister tired and distracted, a shadow of what he had been led to
expect.20 In the aftermath of Nehru’s lacklustre performance in Washington,
Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, concluded that the Indian government
was, ‘in eﬀect being run by others’.21 In oﬀ-the-record brieﬁngs to US journalists,
Rusk underlined the Kennedy administration’s disappointment that having touted
Nehru as a dynamic totem for Asian democracy, instead, India’s leader had proved,
‘old and ill . . . he is in oﬃce but he doesn’t ﬁll it’.22
Nehru had always refused to be drawn on the subject of political succession in
India. In February 1957, when asked by journalists to comment on the country’s
prospects once he had relinquished power, Nehru oﬀered a typically frosty rebuﬀ.
‘The question is foolish and meaningless,’ he exclaimed. ‘I am not running the
country. India is shaping herself.’23 When it came to the thorny problem of
nominating a successor, Nehru preferred to sidestep the issue. Anointing an heir, he
maintained, would subvert Indian democracy, and perhaps more signiﬁcantly, do
more harm than good to the political aspirations of the individual concerned. ‘If
a certain person is named,’ Nehru rationalised, ‘you put that person at a
disadvantage . . . there would be jealousies and the people would possibly react
against something being imposed on them.’24 By way of illustration, the Indian
premier was fond of citing the example of Sir Anthony Eden. After being groomed
for power by Winston Churchill, within months of becoming Britain’s Prime
Minister in April 1955, Eden found himself embroiled in the Suez ﬁasco and was
forced to resign under a cloud. The irony that a sick, and politically ineﬀective
Churchill, had clung on to power far too long in the 1950s than was good either for
himself, his country, or one might plausibly argue, the intensely frustrated Eden,
appeared lost on the Indian premier.
Indeed, striking parallels exist between the transfer of power from Churchill to
Eden in Britain in the mid-1950s, and that which occurred in India between Nehru
and Shastri almost a decade later. In both cases, an iconic national ﬁgure lingered in
oﬃce longer than was medically prudent, and in consequence, compromised their
own political legacy, and more signiﬁcantly, their countries standing on the world
stage. Moreover, whilst Churchill ceded authority to an ailing Eden, Nehru’s
successor had an equally chequered clinical history. A large and growing literature
has explored the topic of medicine and leadership. Building upon the earlier work of
Hugh L’Etang and Bert Park,25 David Owen has provided valuable insights into the
link between the often opaque physical and psychological health of world statesman,
and the detrimental impact that illness in political leaders can have on governmental
decision making.26 The impact of Eden’s health on his disastrous management of the
Suez crisis of 1956 has been well documented.27 In the context of health and
leadership, however, little has been written on the premiership of Nehru, particularly
from the perspective of his ‘Suez’ - the Sino-Indian War of 1962 - or for that matter,
that of Lal Bahadur Shastri. Less still has been made of evidence which suggests that
during his ﬁnal years in power, British and US oﬃcials concluded that Nehru’s
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faltering health risked compromising India’s ability to meet a growing communist
threat to South Asia, and in turn, the stability of the wider international community.
During the course of 1962, Nehru’s health became of increasing concern to
Anglo-American policymakers. That spring, the Prime Minister was taken ill on the
ﬂoor of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s Parliament. Diagnosed as
suﬀering from pyelonephritis, a viral infection of the urinary tract, he spent much of
the following month in bed. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, who had replaced Malcolm
MacDonald as Britain’s High Commissioner in India in 1960, noted that when
Nehru emerged from his convalescence, he appeared, ‘noticeably slower in response.
Less curious, more prejudiced, and, above all, more tired’.28 Moreover, Nehru’s
physical and psychological malaise came at a time when India faced formidable
internal and external threats. Domestically, the Indian economy was under strain as
the country’s Third Five Year Plan faltered. Across the nation food shortages
multiplied, regional tensions festered, and public resentment mounted at endemic
government graft. On the diplomatic front, Nehru’s policy of Sino-Indian friendship
lay in tatters. In 1955, the Indian leader set aside his anxiety over China’s occupation
of Tibet at the beginning of the decade, to sign the Panch Sheel agreement, or Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with Mao Zedong’s government.29 By late 1960,
however, Sino-Indian commitments to respect each other’s territorial integrity and
adhere to a policy of mutual no-aggression rang increasingly hollow, as India and
China jostled to occupy contested ground at either end of their Himalayan border.
Writing to Nehru’s sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, in June 1962, India’s last Viceroy,
and then Chief of Britain’s Defence Staﬀ, Lord Louis Mountbatten, bemoaned that,
‘your wonderful brother is ill and losing his grip at a time when India needs his help
and guidance more than ever’.30
Above all else, Nehru’s conduct following the outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities
that autumn, reinforced the sense amongst senior Anglo-American policymakers
that India’s ailing leader was a liability both to his country, and to the security of
wider Asia. Between October and November 1962, having failed to negotiate a
border agreement with Nehru, the Chinese government lost patience, and imposed a
territorial settlement on India by force of arms. Brushing aside a poorly prepared
and inadequately equipped Indian Army, Chinese troops swept into northern India.
As the architect of India’s China policy, its abject failure left Nehru feeling betrayed,
humiliated, and deeply depressed.31 In contrast, British and US oﬃcials welcomed
the Sino-Indian conﬂict. ‘It is indeed,’ America’s Ambassador to India, John
Kenneth Galbraith, exclaimed excitedly, ‘the kind of opportunity that comes once in
a generation.’32 Speciﬁcally, by supplying Nehru’s government with suﬃcient
military equipment to defend India, without obviously compromising the nation’s
neutrality, Anglo-American oﬃcials hoped to foster a ‘closer understanding, within
their general policy of non-alignment, between India and the West’.33 Equally, given
the gravity of India’s military predicament, it appeared likely that Nehru could be
induced to seek an accommodation with the West’s ally, and India’s regional rival,
Pakistan. In turn, this opened up the possibility that, for the ﬁrst time since 1947,
rather than prepare to ﬁght each other, India and Pakistan would instead work
together to defend the subcontinent’s borders.34
During the six months between October 1962 and April 1963, however, Anglo-
American eﬀorts to utilise the Sino-Indian border war as a platform from which to
renegotiate the basis of India’s relationships with the West, and Pakistan,
ﬂoundered. British and US oﬃcials attributed primary responsibility for this failure
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to Jawaharlal Nehru. On 25 October, as India’s Army crumbled, a humbled Nehru
conceded to an audience of state oﬃcials that that his government had been guilty of,
‘getting out of touch with the modern world [and] . . . living in an artiﬁcial
atmosphere of our own creation’.35 British and US policymakers shared Nehru’s
assessment. Moreover, in their view, an emotionally unstable, erratic, and short-
sighted Indian Prime Minister was to prove himself too old, too inﬁrm, and too
inﬂexible, to respond eﬀectively to the threats and the opportunities presented by
China’s attack on India.36
From the outset of the Sino-Indian war, Nehru’s mismanagement of the military
and political dimensions of the border war unnerved London and Washington. In
line with his government’s policy of non-alignment, the Indian premier initially
declined oﬀers of military aid from Britain and the United States. As Chinese forces
pushed deeper into India, however, Nehru performed a remarkable volte face.37 By
the end of October, Anglo-American military supplies were pouring into New Delhi.
In late November, with the country’s defensive line in the north-east broken, and
with the states of Assam and West Bengal eﬀectively defenceless, Nehru appeared on
the verge of losing control of his government, and from the perspective of Anglo-
American oﬃcials, his senses.38 To Washington’s alarm, on 20 November, the Indian
Premier called for direct US military intervention in the Sino-Indian border war.
Writing to John F. Kennedy, Nehru asked the incredulous US President to send
twelve squadrons of US supersonic ﬁghters, two squadrons of bombers and a mobile
radar network to India.39 At the time, India’s border war with China remained a
localised and relatively small-scale aﬀair. With the world having peered over the
nuclear precipice just weeks before during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy was
stunned at Nehru’s failure to weigh the global implications of precipitating a Sino-
American military confrontation. With Nehru ‘clearly in a state of panic’, Kennedy
concluded that the ageing Indian leader had lost both his nerve, and with it, his sense
of reason.40
An ill-conceived bid by Nehru to retain the services of his Defence Minister, and
closest political conﬁdante, V.K. Krishna Menon, had an equally sobering eﬀect on
Anglo-American perceptions of the India’s leader’s faltering judgment. As India’s
Defence Minister, Menon was held culpable for the nation’s military humiliation by
his parliamentary colleagues, the nation’s press, and the Indian public. Nehru
doggedly resisted calls to sack Menon, however, and only accepted his ‘resignation’
on 7 November, once Congress Party leaders conﬁrmed that his own position as
Prime Minister would become untenable were Menon to remain in government.41 In
fact, by the end of October, Washington had become so concerned at Nehru’s failure
to comprehend the corrosive impact that Menon was having on domestic and
international support for his government, that a plan was hatched to discredit the
defence minister.42 In late October, Carl Kaysen, Kennedy’s deputy national security
advisor, asked the British to plant stories in UK newspapers attacking Menon.
Equally keen to see the demise of ‘Nehru’s evil genius’, the British, nevertheless,
rejected Kaysen’s proposal.43 Vilifying in Menon in the British press, Whitehall
reasoned, would raise Indian hackles, and prove ‘more likely to save Menon than
send him under’.44 The temptation for British and US oﬃcials to covertly intervene
in Indian politics would prove harder to resist, however, when the struggle to succeed
Nehru gathered momentum in early 1964.
A further cause of Anglo-American disillusionment with Nehru centred on the
Indian premier’s refusal to embrace the Sino-Indian war as an opportunity to
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normalise Indo-Pakistan relations. In August 1947, the partition of British India into
the sovereign states of India and Pakistan occurred against a background of
recrimination, unprecedented communal violence and mass population migration.
Partition threw up a number of intractable territorial and political disputes, which
subsequently poisoned relations between India and Pakistan. Chief amongst these
was Pakistan’s claim on the Indian-controlled state of Kashmir. Indo-Pakistan
enmity, as Anglo-American policymakers were all too aware, threatened to
compromise their strategic plans for South Asia. As the British Commonwealth
Relations Oﬃce (CRO) rationalised, it would be ‘self-contradictory’ for Britain and
the United States to help India build a ‘credible deterrent to a very real Chinese
military threat’, if in the process, their disgruntled Pakistani ally were pushed into
the arms of Beijing or Moscow.45 Indeed, to the irritation of Anglo-American
oﬃcials, the limited military support India received from Britain and the United
States in October 1962, prompted Pakistan’s President, Ayub Khan, to take out a
regional reinsurance policy, and cultivate closer ties with China.46 By continuing to
supply India with military aid, Britain’s High Commissioner in Karachi underlined
on 7 November: ‘We could well ﬁnd that we had forfeited Pakistan friendship and
Western alignment once and for all without gaining any lasting advantage in
India.’47
Accordingly, in late November, British and US policymakers used their military
leverage over India to cajole a resentful Nehru into holding ministerial-level talks
with Pakistan, on Kashmir and other related areas of dispute.48 To the frustration of
London and Washington, however, over the subsequent six months, six rounds of
discussions succeeded only in embittering Indo-Pakistan relations. Rightly or
wrongly, Anglo-American oﬃcials had long viewed Nehru as the chief obstacle to an
Indo-Pakistan accord. Back in August 1961, Gore-Booth observed that as a
descendant of Kashmiri Brahmins, the Indian premier appeared, ‘so emotionally
involved over the integration of his family’s homeland into India, that on Kashmir at
least he is completely irrational’. ‘We shall have to wait for Mr. Nehru’s successor,’
London was advised, ‘before we can have an Indian Government willing to consider
a compromise [on Kashmir].’49 In November 1962, Gore-Booth’s assessment
continued to ring true in Whitehall. In New Delhi, conversations Britain’s Secretary
of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, held with members of the
Indian cabinet indicated that India’s Home Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister
for Economic and Defence Co-ordination, T.T. Krishnamachari, and Defence
Minister, Yashwantrao Chavan, favoured reaching a settlement with Pakistan in
some form.50 Moreover, India’s Commonwealth Secretary, Y.D. Gundevia, assured
British oﬃcials that momentum was building within the Congress Party for an
‘urgent settlement’ of the Kashmir dispute.51 In contrast, Sandys discovered a ‘highly
emotional’ Nehru to be adamantly opposed to an accommodation with Pakistan.
Slamming his ﬁst against a table, the Indian leader insisted to the British Secretary of
State, that India’s defeat by China would not be followed by ‘surrender to Pakistani
blackmail’.52
To British and US policymakers, India’s defeat during the Sino-Indian war was
symptomatic of the nation’s deeper political malaise. In Nehru, India had a leader
rooted in the past, a premier seemingly unable to adapt to new and unfamiliar
political and military challenges. In this sense, Anglo-American oﬃcials welcomed
the end of the Nehru era. The advent of fresh, progressive, and hopefully pro-
Western Indian Prime Minister would, it was hoped, revitalise their governments’
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ﬂagging relationship with India. Voicing a frustration shared by many of his
colleagues, Ronald Belcher, Britain’s Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi,
lamented that the Indian leader’s once formidable political powers had been eroded
by a combination of old age and illness. ‘The creative element had gone from his
thinking,’ Belcher later observed, ‘he was increasingly uncommunicative and
forgetful’, and, ‘judged day-to-day events by the ideas and emotions of his past’.
In short, Nehru had become, ‘a drag on the proper administration of Indian
aﬀairs . . . [and] an increasingly unrealistic and at times ineﬀective arbiter of her
external policies’.53
II
Nehru’s management of the Sino-Indian conﬂict had a similarly detrimental eﬀect on
his standing in India. In December 1962, British oﬃcials were advised by contacts
inside the Congress Party that, ‘if it had not been that Nehru was the only politician
with mass support, attempts would already have already been made to oust him’.54
Within a matter of months, Nehru’s value as an electoral asset appeared less certain.
Visiting New Delhi in May 1963, Mountbatten was appalled by the levels of
incompetence and corruption he encountered. ‘There is a complete lack of
leadership’, Mountbatten observed with characteristic self-eﬀacement. ‘Everybody
is very pessimistic about the future. Several people have said to me ‘‘why don’t you
come back and run the country again?’’’55 In 1962, Congress had triumphed in
India’s third general election, securing 361 of the 494 seats available in the Lok
Sabha.56 A year later, the Party suﬀered successive by-election defeats in the
previously safe seats of Amroka, Farrukkabad, and Rajkot.57
Having arrived back in New Delhi in July to take up a second stint as US
Ambassador, Chester Bowles was shocked by the political developments that had
taken place since he had last served in India a decade before. ‘In my ﬁrst twenty-four
hours [in India]’, Bowles conﬁded to his diary, ‘it is apparent that I will be a witness
to the collapse of an era, or rather I should say to its petering out. Nehru was 80 per
cent of Indian government authority; now he must be 30 per cent as the struggle for
supremacy is on with a vengeance.’58 Scenting political blood, the following month
opposition MPs tabled a motion of no conﬁdence in Nehru’s government in the Lok
Sabha. Nehru comfortably survived the challenge. In the process, however, he was
subjected to the unedifying spectacle of his parliamentary opponents banging their
seats and shouting: ‘Quit, Nehru quit!’59 With his authority diminished, Congress
leaders ﬂexing their muscle, and critics sniping at him from the political sidelines, as
the Central intelligence Agency (CIA) noted: ‘For the ﬁrst time, Indian politicians,
both within his party and outside it, seemed to be increasingly willing to contemplate
seriously a period when Nehru would not be around.’60
Indications that Nehru’s premiership was drawing to a close prompted British
and US policymakers to take stock of the threats that independent India’s ﬁrst
transfer of power posed to the countries internal stability, and in consequence, its
external relations. In private, Anglo-American oﬃcials continued to pillory Nehru
for his ‘irritating characteristics of stubbornness and ungratefulness’.61 They were
aware, however, that in country notable for the range of its cultural, linguistic and
religious diversity, Nehru’s power and prestige had acted as a powerful unifying
inﬂuence in the past. Back in October 1958, Malcolm MacDonald had expressed
scepticism that India could long remain, ‘a wholly compact nation’. For the majority
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of their history, MacDonald argued, Indians had been divided, and only had only
been forced together by exceptional internal ﬁgures, or strong external forces. ‘In the
near future much will depend on whether Mr. Nehru will be succeeded by a national
leader,’ the British High Commissioner had predicted, ‘ . . . who can preserve a robust
national unity.’62
British and US oﬃcials were equally concerned that a weak and divided India
might be subsumed by communal violence. The country’s 360,000,000 Hindu citizens
lived cheek by jowl with 50,000,000 Muslims, and 20,000,000 followers of other
minority religions, such as Sikhism, Jainism, and Christianity. In January 1964, a
spiral of religious and communal disturbances that had begun in Kashmir the
previous December, claimed hundreds of lives in East Pakistan and West Bengal.63
Many British oﬃcials then serving in India had witnessed at ﬁrst hand the communal
holocaust that engulfed the subcontinent in 1947, and were left with an abiding sense
of the fragility of the country’s communal consensus. While lauding the eﬀort that
Nehru had made to keep India a ‘truly secular state’, the British suspected that the
commitment of the country’s Hindu majority to this ideal remained ‘dangerously
shallow’.64 Whitehall’s anxiety was echoed in Washington. At the CIA, the Agency’s
South Asian analysts noted that the ‘conservative and illiterate masses of India’
were, on the whole, more susceptible to the emotionally charged sermons delivered
by religious extremists, than they were to the measured rhetoric employed by
proponents of secularism. In India’s 1962 general election, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh,
or Indian People’s Party, the standard bearer of Hindu traditionalism, had polled
only 6.1% of the national vote. In its northern stronghold of Bihar and Madhya
Pradesh, however, the Jan Sangh had run Congress close. For many of India’s
Muslims, Nehru embodied the nation’s commitment to secularism, and as the CIA
emphasised, was considered to be ‘their best guarantee that the usual social and
economic discrimination against Muslims by Hindus would at least not be oﬃcially
countenanced’.65 A new Indian premier, and particularly one more associated with
Hindu orthodoxy than Nehruvian agnosticism, faced an uphill battle to retain the
conﬁdence of his Muslim citizens. The CRO doubted that any future Indian
government, whatever the strength of its opposition to communalism, ‘can in all
circumstances stand against it with the eﬀectiveness of Nehru’s instant and
unquestioned resolution’.66
The spectre of future civil disorder in India led Anglo-American oﬃcials to
question whether, in the long term, the country would remain a democracy. ‘It is a
mark of his [Nehru’s] success,’ the British reﬂected, ‘that so far India has remained a
country where men can freely speak their minds. Will his successors be willing or able
to maintain this sort of vigilance to keep India on the democratic rails?’67 Although
Indians had readily assimilated the concepts of elections and of parliamentary
debate, the idea of representative government was still a relatively recent
phenomenon in the subcontinent. By the late 1950s, Pakistan, having initially
embraced democracy, had drifted toward a more autocratic form of government
dominated by the military. ‘Did Jawaharlal Nehru create foundations for viable new
democratic Indian society,’ Chester Bowles pondered, ‘or did he simply postpone a
political debacle?’68
Having experienced at ﬁrst hand the confusion and uncertainty which followed
the traumatic transition of presidential power from Kennedy to Lyndon Johnson in
the United States in November 1963, to Robert Komer, the National Security
Council’s South Asian expert, it appeared possible that India might descend into
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‘disarray’ on Nehru’s death. ‘A deep political crisis [in India]’, Komer counselled
senior Washington policymakers, ‘is not inconceivable’.69 India’s President,
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, shared Komer’s concern. In January 1964, Radhakrish-
nan conﬁded to Gore-Booth, that he had been left ‘deeply depressed’ by India’s lapse
into a national torpor at the very moment that communism was making inroads
across Asia. Cambodia, Radhakrishnan suggested, was shifting into the Chinese
orbit. The situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating. In Laos, the Prime Minister
had entered into hopeless negotiations with the Pathet Lao, and Burma was pretty
well in communist hands. The emergence of a communist state in Indonesia seemed
only a matter of time. Meanwhile, an ill and ineﬀectual Nehru remained dangerously
quiescent.70 Endorsing Radhakrishnan’s exposition of the ‘Domino Thesis’, Gore-
Booth cautioned the CRO that: ‘Almost anything might emerge from all this [the
succession] from the best to the worst.’71 British fears that India might prove
susceptible to the imposition of an authoritarian system of government were, in part,
informed by cultural factors. Oﬃcials in the British High Commission in New Delhi
noted that Nehru, above all others, had insisted on his countryman adhering,
‘fundamental standards, many of them by no means natural to India’. The strong
stand taken by the Indian premier in favour of universal suﬀrage and against
nepotism, corruption, and other abuses of power, were attributed, in large part, to
‘the Westerner - indeed the Britisher - in him.’ It appeared debatable, in the eyes of
many British oﬃcials that such ‘ideal standards’ could be maintained, ‘in this vast
Eastern and largely Hindu society’.72
In an international context, British oﬃcials were concerned that Nehru’s passing
would see a diminution in Whitehall’s inﬂuence on the subcontinent. The Indian
leader’s aﬃnity for Britain’s traditions, culture and society, and personal friendships
with members of the British establishment, was not, by and large, shared by his
political contemporaries.73 In 1955, the US State Department had complained that
when it came to dealing with India, ‘. . . the British have a certain advantage over us
in the form of Mr. Nehru’s adoration of English civilisation and individuals . . .’74 In
particular, the intimate bond which Nehru had established with Lord Mountbatten,
proved a diplomatic boon for successive British governments. When India
considered purchasing Soviet bombers in 1955, was tempted to acquire Moscow’s
latest supersonic ﬁghters in 1962, or appeared poised to scupper Indo-Pakistan talks
on Kashmir in 1963, Mountbatten had been dispatched to New Delhi to talk Nehru
round.75 In Nehru’s absence, one oﬃcial from the CRO underlined, ‘we shall no
longer have the enormously valuable access to the Indian Government’s inner
councils which Lord Mountbatten’s personal friendship with him gave us at crucial
moments’.76
Moreover, the end of Nehru era carried implications for both the future of the
British Commonwealth, and that of the Anglo-American special relationship. After
August 1947, many Indians evidenced feelings of ambivalence, if not hostility,
toward the British Commonwealth. More than anyone, it was Nehru who ensured
that India remained inside the Commonwealth after it had become a republic in
1950, and had stayed in during periods of acute Anglo-Indian tension, most notably
in the Suez Crisis in 1956. ‘India’s Commonwealth membership is by no means so
ﬁrmly established,’ the CRO acknowledged in 1964. ‘If really serious strains should
again develop in Indo-British relations or in inter-Commonwealth relations
generally, Nehru’s ultimately eﬀective championship of Indian membership, and
of the value of the modern Commonwealth itself, could be critically missed.’77 For if
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India left the Commonwealth, the British recognised, other Afro-Asian members
were far more likely to follow suit. Likewise, the Foreign Oﬃce acknowledged that in
the 1960s, as the United States focused on the developing world as a crucial cold-war
battleground, ‘it is our [British] inﬂuence and knowledge of the world outside
Europe, especially in the Commonwealth, which has most value to-day in the eyes of
Americans . . .’. It was in this context that the British looked to ‘preserve the Anglo-
American partnership . . . by support[ing] India as the counter-attraction to China in
Asia.’78 Lacking the resources to make a signiﬁcant military or economic impact on
the subcontinent, the value of Whitehall’s contribution to the Anglo-American
partnership in South Asia lay in its ability to bring informal inﬂuence, or soft power,
to bear in India. This would prove far more diﬃcult to do, British oﬃcials conceded,
without Nehru as India’s leader.79
III.
The hopes and fears which British and US policymakers harboured in relation to
India’s future, acquired added piquancy on 6 January 1964, when Nehru suﬀered a
stroke during the Congress Party’s annual conference in Bhubaneswar, eastern
India. Attempts by the Indian government to play down the seriousness of Nehru’s
illness, contrasted with images of the listless Indian leader being carried in a
wheelchair from the aeroplane that returned him to New Delhi a week later.80 Back
in Washington, the State Department took the precaution of asking US medical
experts to review Nehru’s clinical background. Their conclusions made for grim
reading. ‘Given Nehru’s history,’ the State Department was advised, ‘a recurrence of
Thrombosis is likely. This might be in a day, week or decade. He [Nehru] is walking
on eggs.’81 Preparing for the worse, State Department oﬃcers began the macabre
task of drafting condolence messages from Lyndon Johnson to Radhakrishnan,
Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit.82
Of the candidates vying to succeed Nehru as India’s Prime Minister, British and
US oﬃcials favoured the veteran Congress politician, Lal Bahadur Shastri. A
diminutive ﬁve feet and two inches tall, Shastri’s physique and unassuming
temperament had earned him the sobriquet, ‘The Sparrow’. Having joined the
Congress Party whilst still in his teens, Shastri’s steady rise through its ranks
culminated in his appointment as India’s Home Minister in 1961. At Nehru’s behest,
from August 1963 he had spent time outside of government, revitalising the Congress
Party’s administrative machinery. By the following January, however, he was back in
the Indian cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with responsibility for the Cabinet
Secretariat and the departments of External Aﬀairs and Atomic Energy. To Anglo-
American policymakers Shastri represented something of an enigma. He had never
travelled outside South Asia, and lacked an international proﬁle.83 More
signiﬁcantly, question marks surrounded Shastri’s health. In October 1959, he had
suﬀered a major heart attack. Although apparently fully recovered, many political
commentators ruled Shastri out of the succession race on medical grounds.84
In his favour, however, Shastri was widely regarded as, ‘pleasant, intelligent,
[and] highly public spirited’. The British noted that he had acquired, ‘the rare
reputation in Indian politics of complete freedom from corruption and political
jobbery’.85 In addition, he appeared appropriately anti-communist, and was thought
to hold moderate views on economic and foreign policy issues.86 The ﬁfty-nine-year-
old Shastri, Washington concluded early in 1964, would prove a ‘cautious’ and
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‘pragmatic’ Indian leader, whose consensual style would be welcomed by a majority
within the Congress Party.87 Indeed, from an Anglo-American standpoint, the
combination of Shastri’s reputation for political expediency and his occupation of
the centre ground in Indian politics, constituted his principal strength. As a skilled
conciliator, Shastri was expected to minimise the ﬁssiparous, communal, and
economic risks associated with a transfer of power, and preside over ‘a more
reasonable Indian Government, even on Kashmir’.88 At the same time, British and
US oﬃcials were encouraged by indications that Shastri would welcome closer and
more harmonious relations between India and the West.89 With ‘Nehru on his last
legs’, Robert Komer assured Lyndon Johnson in April 1964, ‘. . . Shastri – the heir
apparent, looks good from our viewpoint’.90
The same could not be said of the leader of the Congress Party’s right wing, and
India’s former Finance Minister, Morarji Desai. A devout Hindu, Desai practised
yoga and spun khaddar each morning, championed prohibition, kept to a Spartan
dietary regime, and observed a vow of celibacy.91 Renowned for his ﬁscal
conservatism, advocacy of free enterprise, and pro-Western outlook, Desai was
well regarded by India’s business community and Anglo-American policymakers. By
1958, US oﬃcials had marked him out as a man to watch within the Indian cabinet,
and ‘one of the leading candidates for the Prime Ministership after Nehru’.92 The
British agreed, concluding in July 1962 that Desai was well placed in the succession
stakes. ‘If Mr. Nehru were to die tomorrow,’ the CRO opined, ‘ . . . it is reasonable to
assume . . . the appointment as Prime Minister of Mr. Morarji Desai.’93 As a future
leader of India, however, British and US oﬃcials considered Desai to have a number
of serious drawbacks. With age and inﬁrmity a central issue in the succession debate,
although in good health, at nearly sixty-eight years of age, the State Department felt
that Desai was, ‘probably past his peak’. More important, however, was his tendency
to divide both party and country. ‘Desai . . .’ the US State Department observed, ‘is
bitterly opposed by the [Congress] party’s leftist faction and is disliked by the
dominant party leaders of the south because of his inﬂexible attitudes.’ Moreover,
Desai’s reputation as ‘a Hindu nationalist’ generated unsettled India’s Muslim
community.94 When it came to Indo-Pakistan relations, the CRO cautioned, Desai’s
‘rigid and extreme anti-Pakistan convictions would make his appointment [as India’s
Prime Minister] little less than a disaster’.95
From the left wing of the Congress Party, Indira Gandhi appeared to be Shastri’s
principal challenger for the premiership. In 1963, Gandhi’s political power had
grown as that of her father had faded. A competent political performer in her own
right, she had been an active President of the Congress Party between 1959 and
1960.96 Although Gandhi repeatedly disclaimed interest in becoming India’s next
leader, in January 1964 she outpolled all other candidates in elections to the
Congress Party Working Committee, and was rumoured to covet the post of
Minister of External Aﬀairs.97 Furthermore, from her position as Nehru’s
nursemaid, appointments secretary, and political conﬁdante, Gandhi appeared
well placed to manipulate the outcome of the succession process. In a cable sent to
Washington on 28 January, Chester Bowles underlined that: ‘Having assumed a role
similar to that of Mrs Woodrow Wilson, to whom she [Gandhi] is being compared,
she controls access to the PM and is only person who regularly consults him. She is
thus in unique position to inﬂuence PM on any issue . . .’98 Any aspirations Gandhi
may have had to succeed her father were handicapped, however, by the fact that she
held no elective oﬃce, lacked the broad political appeal necessary to sustain a
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challenge for the premiership, and had not previously served in government.99
Bowles derided her long-term political future, asserting that although she might
eventually end up in a future Indian cabinet, Gandhi ‘would probably drift out of
active politics in a year or two’.100 In fact, as the succession struggle approached its
climax in the late spring of 1964, Indira Gandhi rejected appeals from Congress
Party oﬃcials to throw her hat into the leadership ring. Daunted by her lack of
government experience and emotionally exhausted from the strain of caring for her
father during his long illness, Gandhi rejected the opportunity to succeed her
father.101
IV.
By the spring of 1964, British and US policymakers had become exasperated by
Nehru’s refusal to step down from power and bring an end to his lame-duck
administration. After calling on India’s premier in March, a despondent Chester
Bowles informed Washington that: ‘It was quite impossible to communicate with
him [Nehru].’ ‘His mind was simply not in gear . . . it is diﬃcult for me to believe that
he can last long as eﬀective political force in India.’102 Many Indians felt likewise. To
B.K. Nehru, India’s Ambassador to the United States, Nehru’s illness had, ‘left him
with an increasing inability to grapple with pressing problems or to take
decisions’.103 The Prime Minister’s increasingly rare public appearances provided
further evidence, if any were needed, of his faltering grip on power. In April, the
British noted that he had appeared ‘terribly and pathetically old and absent’ during a
visit to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences.104 Concluding that Nehru’s time
as Prime Minister was drawing rapidly to a close, Anglo-American oﬃcials began
contemplating how they could enhance Lal Bahadur Shastri’s prospects of becoming
his successor.
In Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, British and US oﬃcials identiﬁed a powerful ally in
their bid to smooth Shastri’s path to power. The seventy-four-year-old Radhak-
rishnan had served as India’s President since May 1962, having been Vice-President
for the previous decade. A renowned scholar and former Oxford don, he came to the
presidency determined to exercise more of the constitutional power vested in his
oﬃce than had his predecessor, Rajendra Prasad. On paper, Radhakrishnan’s
powers were impressive. The President held supreme command of the country’s
armed forces, could declare a state of emergency and impose central rule in any state
of the Indian union, and crucially, was responsible for summoning and dismissing
Parliament and appointing prime ministers. Radhakrishnan took the last of these
responsibilities extremely seriously. India’s President, the CIA observed, had
indicated in the past that he would, ‘seek to inﬂuence the choice of a successor to
Nehru, either temporary or permanent, in any way he could’. Moreover, the
politically conservative Radhakrishnan was expected to favour ‘a moderate’ as the
country’s next premier, ‘such as Shastri’.105 Back in January 1964, Radhakrishnan
had conﬁrmed the veracity of the CIA’s analysis to Mountbatten. The nation’s
future unity, Radhakrishnan argued, would hinge upon the appointment of a
conciliatory leader, who was acceptable to both the left and right wings of the
Congress Party. With so much at stake, India’s President assured Mountbatten, he
would, ‘intervene strongly and if necessary decisively’, in the succession race.106
Following Nehru’s death, the British and US governments quickly focused on
ensuring that Radhakrishnan’s actions matched up to his rhetoric. Within hours of
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arriving in India on 28 May to attend Nehru’s funeral, both Mountbatten, and
Britain’s Prime Minister, Alec Douglas Home, held talks with Radhakrishnan at
Rashtrapati Bhavan, the President’s oﬃcial residence.107 The mechanics of the
succession process dominated the discussions. Mountbatten, in particular, in a
throwback to 1947, interfered shamelessly in India’s internal aﬀairs. During the
course of an hour-long interview with Radhakrishnan, Mountbatten lobbied for the
pro-Western Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to be made India’s Minister for External
Aﬀairs, questioned the appointment of Gulzarilal Nanda as interim Prime Minister,
and urged India’s President to see that Shastri was the country’s next leader.108
When it came to Shastri, at least, Mountbatten was pushing against an open door.
Steps had been taken, Radhakrishnan conﬁrmed, to ensure that Shastri would ‘romp
home by a big majority’ when the Congress Parliamentary Party met to elect its new
leader. Britain, Mountbatten was comforted, could look forward to, ‘a new India,
more forthcoming and friendly and less diﬃcult’.109 Chester Bowles was similarly
reassured after making ‘a private call’ on Radhakrishnan later the same day. A new
Indian government, headed by Shastri, and ‘‘‘more pro-West than ever’’’,
Radhakrishnan assured the US Ambassador, would be in place within a matter of
days.110
Nevertheless, to guard against any unpleasant last-minute surprises, Bowles took
the precaution of inserting ‘observers’ into the campaign teams of both Shastri and
Morarji Desai. Nervous of being caught ‘meddling in Indian aﬀairs’, the British
chose instead to rely on established contacts inside Congress Party headquarters to
provide, ‘a running commentary on the state of play between the rival [leadership]
factions’.111 Indeed, one of the most intriguing facets of Western involvement in the
election of India’s second Prime Minister surrounds the extent to which the British
and US governments provided covert support to Lal Bahadur Shastri’s candidacy.
From early 1964, the British High Commission’s political staﬀ in New Delhi actively
‘encouraged’ senior Indian politicians, ‘to give those who want to pursue a middle of
the road political policy . . . the greatest chance possible’ of succeeding Nehru.112 Less
obvious, is the role that foreign intelligence and propaganda agencies, chieﬂy the
Soviet Security Service (KGB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more obscure
bodies, such as the British Foreign Oﬃce’s Information Research Department
(IRD), played in the succession process. Likewise, important questions remain over
the degree to which British and US oﬃcials sought to inﬂuence the succession
process, through the pages of the Western and Indian press.
The scope and scale of foreign intelligence operations in India grew signiﬁcantly
from the late 1950s, as the subcontinent developed into an increasingly important
cold-war arena. In the 1960s, the KGB residency in New Delhi, which eventually
housed the largest Soviet intelligence presence in the developing world, undertook an
array of ‘active measures’ designed to enhance Moscow’s inﬂuence in India. These
encompassed secretly funding the election expenses and political propaganda of
leading left-wing Indian politicians, such as Krishna Menon. In 1964, they also
included a KGB propaganda operation, conducted at the behest of the Soviet
presidium, to bolster Shastri’s leadership campaign. The rationale underpinning
Moscow’s decision to support Shastri was almost certainly based on its antipathy for
Morarji Desai. Given the option between Shastri becoming India’s next leader, or
Desai, the doyen of India’s right wing, the Soviets opted to back the lesser of two
evils.113 The considerable KGB presence in South Asia, however, attracted far less
attention from India’s press and politicians than that of America’s intelligence
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services. From the mid-1950s, Nehru voiced concern that the United States, in
particular, was ‘carrying on their espionage and secret service activities [in India].
They have also been buying up newspapers and spreading a network of publicity
organisations.’ ‘We are more concerned with what the Americans are trying to do,’
Nehru stated in June 1955, ‘than the others.’114
By the early 1960s, the CIA had a sizable, growing, and active presence in India.
In the words of one former US oﬃcial serving in New Delhi at the time, ‘the CIA
was very, very, active . . . it was very large, and very invasive. The CIA was
everywhere.’115 To date, however, with the exception of studies exposing operations
run by the Agency from northern India and Nepal against Chinese-controlled Tibet,
little has emerged of CIA activity in India.116 Tantalising glimpses of CIA complicity
in the subversion of communist governments in Kerala and West Bengal have been
provided by former US Ambassador’s and USEmbassy oﬃcials.117 Similarly,
evidence from both Indian and US sources suggest that the CIA proved successful in
recruiting important ‘assets’ inside the Indian government. Notably, M.O. Mathai,
who served as Jawaharlal Nehru’s Private Secretary until the late 1950s, is amongst
those alleged to have worked for US intelligence. Nehru’s most prominent
biographer has gone as far as to state that, ‘It can . . . be safely assumed that, from
1946 to 1959, the CIA had access to every paper passing through Nehru’s
Secretariat.’118
Whilst the charges levelled against Mathai remain contentious, former State
Department oﬃcers have corroborated claims of collusion between Indian
government oﬃcials and the CIA. One USdiplomat has recalled how the CIA
station in New Delhi boasted that it could obtain a copy of any document produced
by the Indian government. ‘So I put this to the test once,’ the oﬃcial recalled, ‘and
they [the CIA] provided it for me.’119 Indeed, it does seem that the CIA was
remarkably well informed on the substance of discussions taking place inside the
Indian cabinet throughout the Nehru era.120 Moreover, as the USgovernment’s
focus on India intensiﬁed in the wake of the Sino-Indian War, the CIA strengthened
its links with India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), by sponsoring joint Indo-US covert
operations against the People’s Republic of China.121
The CIA strongly endorsed the State Department’s view that the ‘succession
problem’ in India represented a threat to USinterests. ‘[The] continuing successful
economic and political development in India is immensely important to US policy
objectives,’ an Agency report emphasised in January 1964. ‘The Congress Party must
be on guard to maintain the strength and unity necessary to guarantee an easy
transition to a new government if that should be required in the near future.’122 On
previous occasions, when Washington had felt its wider interests threatened by
developments on the subcontinent, be it in Kerala in the late 1950s, or West Bengal
in the late 1960s, the White house had ordered the CIA to intervene in India’s
domestic politics. The CIA undoubtedly retained the capacity to do likewise when it
came to the selection of Nehru’s successor. Before taking up the post of
USAmbassador in India in 1961, John Kenneth Galbraith had been alarmed to
discover that the CIA had set aside millions of dollars to subsidise the election
campaigns of ‘friendly’ Indian politicians, and to ﬁnance the publication of Indian
newspapers and magazines of an ‘adequately anti-communist temper’. Galbraith’s
subsequent attempts to curtail CIA activity in India met with only partial success.123
As one irate member of his Embassy staﬀ recalled, the CIA continued, issuing
‘bribes, peddling highly tendentious material, buying oﬀ newspapers – of course,
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without telling us anything about it.’124 CIA records relating to the Agency’s
domestic operations in India remained classiﬁed. However, given the strategic
importance which Washington attached to South Asia, and the CIA’s history of
intervention in India’s domestic politics, it seems plausible, if not probable to
assume, that the Agency provided covert support to the Anglo-American diplomatic
eﬀort to inﬂuence the appointment of Nehru’s successor.
Indeed, when it came to India, the CIA was by no means alone in ‘peddling’
propaganda, and attempting to purchase inﬂuence. Within the US Embassy in New
Delhi, both Galbraith and Chester Bowles appreciated the power of the press to
shape the political agenda on the subcontinent. A former Madison Avenue
advertising executive, Bowles, in particular, assiduously courted New Delhi’s
international press corps, and kept up a regular correspondence with New York
Times luminaries Harrison Salisbury and Scotty Reston, back in the United States.
Salisbury routinely received ‘highly conﬁdential’ memoranda from Bowles, which
laid out the Ambassador’s views on a wide range of issues aﬀecting the subcontinent.
On occasions, these included oﬃcial policy papers prepared by Embassy staﬀ in
Delhi, ‘for strictly oﬀ-the-record use’.125 Britain’s High Commission matched
Bowles’ enthusiasm for political ‘spin’. Its oﬃcials met regularly with senior Indian
pressmen, and local correspondents from the major British dailies, for ‘oﬀ the record
exchanges of view’.126 In January 1964, in one typical exchange with S. Mulgaokar,
editor of the inﬂuential Hindustan Times, Ronald Belcher baldy stated Whitehall’s
position that India needed a change of leadership. ‘From the point of view of India’s
international standing,’ Belcher informed Mulgaokar, ‘it was certainly important to
remove as soon as possible the growing impression of a drift and ineﬃciency which
was gaining currency almost everywhere these days, largely as a result of Mr.
Nehru’s age and ill health.’127
From a British perspective, further intriguing questions surround the involve-
ment of the Foreign Oﬃce’s Information Research Department in the transition of
power from Nehru to Shastri. The IRD had been established in 1948 to counter the
spread of Soviet propaganda in Britain and throughout the developing world.128
During the 1950s, IRD personnel were seconded to British diplomatic missions
abroad, and tasked with feeding anti-communist literature to networks of local
journalists and politicians. Although IRD ﬁrst established contacts in India in the
early 1950s, most notably with B.N. Mullik, the head of India’s Intelligence
Bureau,129 it was not until January 1962 that the ﬁrst permanent IRD representative,
Peter Joy, was posted to New Delhi. Unlike the British Security Service (MI5), which
employed a ‘declared’, or overt, Security Liaison Oﬃcer (SLO) in New Delhi,130 Joy
operated covertly under cover provided by the British Information Service. After a
diﬃcult initial period during which Indian non-alignment hampered his eﬀorts to
recruit local contacts, the onset of the Sino-Indian War transformed Joy’s fortunes.
A demand emerged almost overnight for IRD material on the evils of Chinese
communism from Indian journalists and research centres, as well as from
government departments such as the Ministry of External Aﬀairs, Press Information
Bureau, and All India Radio. By early 1964, Joy had established active relationships
with over 100 ‘well-placed and inﬂuential individuals throughout India’, some of
whom received covert payments from IRD. In addition, two publishing houses in the
Indian capital were busy disseminating IRD material on a non-attributable basis.131
Under Joy’s guidance, the IRD was particularly successful in cultivating ‘assets’
in the Indian press. One IRD survey estimated that its material had appeared in over
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500 Indian newspaper articles during the course of 1964 alone. ‘We are able,’ the
IRD crowed, ‘to get the right article into the right paper at the right time.’132
Moreover, the IRD interpreted its role in India in the broadest possible context.
‘Britain’s interest [in India] lies in a strong Central Government,’ a senior IRD
oﬃcial observed, ‘to the maintenance of which I.R.D. no less than any other
instruments of British policy, should have a contribution to make.’ Having invited
IRD into India two years earlier, it appears likely that Paul Gore-Booth and the
British High Commission utilised Joy’s inﬂuence with the Indian press to augment
their own ‘of the record brieﬁngs’ on the succession question. Notably, in early 1964,
as the race to succeed Nehru approached its climax, Peter Joy recorded with
satisfaction that Mulgaokar’s Hindustan Times, in particular, had ‘not been inactive
on our behalf recently’. The subsequent evolution of IRD activity in India adds to
the suspicion that that the role the organisation played on the subcontinent extended
well beyond the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda. In 1967, having
expanded its operation from New Delhi into Calcutta and Madras, and with India’s
fourth general election looming, IRD lobbied Whitehall for a more interventionist
remit on the subcontinent. ‘IRD should,’ its management argued, ‘concentrate more
than hitherto on the cultivation of inﬂuential Congress Ministers, M.P.’s and senior
civil servants.’133
On 1 June 1964, as Radhakrishnan had predicted, soundings taken amongst
MPs, Cabinet Ministers and the Chief Ministers of India’s States conﬁrmed Shastri
as the Congress Party’s choice to succeed Nehru as India’s leader. The next day,
Gulzarilal Nanda proposed, and Morarji Desai seconded, Lal Bahadur Shastri’s
nomination as leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party. ‘This will eﬀectively
make him [Shastri] Prime Minister,’ the British High Commission reported back to
the CRO, ‘[and] after a contest far less disruptive than many people here and abroad
had apprehended.’134 Or, as the Guardian noted wryly, in comparison with the
contentious transfer of power from Harold Macmillan to Alec Douglas-Home that
had taken place in London the previous October, Shastri had been installed as
Nehru’s successor, ‘with more dispatch, and much more dignity, than was the new
Prime Minister of Britain’.135
V.
Lal Bahadur Shastri had never met senior British or US government oﬃcials before
he became India’s Prime Minister. The man who had taken charge of the world’s
largest democracy was an enigma to all but a handful of middle-ranking Anglo-
American oﬃcials. Shastri had been bequeathed a host of potentially explosive
political problems, from escalating food prices and disquiet over the adoption of
Hindi as India’s oﬃcial language, to embittered Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani
relations. Many Western observers drew comparisons between Nehru’s passing and
that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt almost twenty years earlier. On both occasions a
ﬁgure of global standing had died in oﬃce during a period of national transition, and
had been replaced by a relative unknown, in Roosevelt’s case the former senator
from Missouri, Harry S. Truman. ‘Not many [people] knew Shastri,’ one US
diplomat stationed in India at the time recalled. ‘Who was he? What would he
do?’136
Chester Bowles, who had had little contact with Shastri before he became Prime
Minister, was immediately taken with India’s new leader. ‘His diminutive size has
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tended to underline the impression of a quiet, unassuming, weak, meek man,’ Bowles
informed Dean Rusk. ‘However . . . I have been impressed with his intellectual
qualities, his ﬂexibility of mind and what appears to be an inner strength.’137 The
British agreed with Bowles’ assessment, noting in early June that Shastri’s ‘actions
and speeches since he stepped forward from Nehru’s overpowering shadow have
shown an encouraging grasp and self-conﬁdence.’138 British and US policymakers
did not expect Shastri to deviate signiﬁcantly from the four pillars of Nehruvian
policy: democracy; secularism; a mixed, socialist orientated economy; and a non-
aligned foreign policy. It was deemed likely, however, that he would evidence less of
an ‘attachment for the USSR and ‘‘socialism’’’ than Nehru, and in the long run,
prove more ﬂexible on a range of issues from Kashmir to the role played by private
enterprise in the Indian economy.139 Likewise, whereas Nehru had frustrated Anglo-
American oﬃcials with his ‘emotional’ and ‘impressionistic’ manner, Shastri
appeared pragmatic and level-headed.140 In conversation with Ellsworth Bunker,
who had served as US Ambassador to India in the late 1950s, the leading Indian
industrialist and Congress stalwart, B.M Birla, reinforced US perceptions that
Shastri was someone with whom they could do business. ‘The general attitude in
[Shastri’s] Government,’ Birla assured Bunker, ‘would be more friendly toward the
US, the UK and the West than it was under Mr. Nehru’s administration.’141
Given Shastri’s inexperience in foreign aﬀairs Whitehall approached the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, which was scheduled to take place in
London, in July 1964, as a valuable opportunity to get to know the ‘stranger’ at the
head of India’s government, and more importantly, to inﬂuence his global outlook.
‘What he [Shastri] learns - and how he learns it - at the Commonwealth Prime
Minister’s Meeting’, CRO oﬃcials suggested, ‘will. . . be of great importance’.142 In
particular, the British hoped to ‘educate’ Shastri on the Chinese threat to Southeast
Asia, and the principles underpinning the UK’s defence, disarmament and colonial
policies.143 In a precursor of things to come, however, Shastri suﬀered a heart attack
on 26 June, and was forced him to cancel his trip to London.144 Ironically, given the
obsessive attention Anglo-American oﬃcials had paid to Nehru’s health, and its
impact on his decision making, news of Shastri’s medical scare caused little anxiety
in London or Washington. In part this can be attributed to a reticence on the part of
British and US policymakers to confront the uncomfortable reality that Shastri’s
premiership might turn out to be as medically compromised as that of his
predecessor. Equally, as a victim of coronary heart disease himself, Lyndon Johnson
was predisposed to downplay its impact on his own leadership. In conversation with
Indira Gandhi, back in April 1964, Johnson had emphasised that, ‘people had
counted him out at the time of his own heart attack. But two months later he was
back in shape again and had been ever since’.145
To the British government’s discomfort, however, when Shastri did make it to
England in December 1964, he proved to be a good deal less impressionable than
had been anticipated. During four days of talks with British ministers, Gore-Booth
noted that, Shastri took unexpectedly strident positions on colonialism, espousing
‘independence for everyone’; economic aid, stating ‘our problems are bigger than
yours’; and Kashmir, where ‘he took a rather surprisingly orthodox and rigid
stand’.146 British oﬃcials would have been less surprised had they taken the trouble
to look back more closely into Shastri’s past. In 1956, the future Indian leader had
chastised those who confused his unassuming demeanour with a lack of inner steel.
‘Perhaps due to my being small in size and soft in tongue people are apt to believe
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that I am not able to be very ﬁrm with them,’ Shastri had observed. ‘Though not
physically strong I think I am internally not that weak.’147 Washington found Shastri
just intractable. The Indian premier’s unexpectedly tough posture on Kashmir irked
US oﬃcials, as did his decision to accept military aid from the Soviets. Moreover,
given Lyndon Johnson’s increasing obsession with the war his administration was
ﬁghting in Vietnam, Shastri’s criticism of America’s Southeast Asian policy
aggravated a particularly raw presidential nerve.148
In April 1965, Indo-US relations went from bad to worse. Irritated by Pakistan’s
ongoing ﬂirtation with Communist China, Lyndon Johnson cancelled plans for
Ayub Khan to visit to the United States. To the dismay of Chester Bowles back in
New Delhi, in an ill-judged display of regional ‘even-handedness’, at the same time,
Johnson withdrew a standing invitation for Shastri to visit Washington.149 In the
Times of India, Johnson’s ‘unprovoked snub’ was disparaged as an ‘ill-deserved
discourtesy’.150 In London, the Economist observed wryly that by scrubbing both the
Ayub and Shastri visits, Johnson had accomplished, ‘the unusual diplomatic feat of
giving oﬀence to both [India and Pakistan] simultaneously’.151 By May 1965, it had
become glaringly apparent to the State Department that Shastri was a foreign-policy
pragmatist, willing to work with the East, the West, and preferably both, to further
India’s interests. ‘In long run,’ US oﬃcials concluded, ‘he [Shastri] may intensify the
search for alternative sources of support that make India less reliant on the US.’152
Within a matter of months, ham-ﬁsted attempts by Britain and the United States to
maintain a posture of neutrality following renewed Indo-Pakistani clashes over
Kashmir had further alienated Shastri’s government. In the aftermath of the brief
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, Britain and the United States, as the State Department
had feared, were left to watch from the diplomatic sidelines as the Soviet Union took
on the role of South Asian peacemaker. When Britain’s premier, Harold Wilson,
tried to intercede in the aﬀairs of India and Pakistan after 1965, a cabinet colleague
later reﬂected, they ‘just ignored him’.153
VI.
British and US government documents on the succession to Jawaharlal Nehru oﬀer
up new perspectives on the nature of Anglo-American relations with India in the
early 1960s. Viewed in the round, they provide fresh insights into the concerns which
British and US policymakers harboured for India’s survival as a stable, secular, and
unitary democracy, and the degree to which the Nehru-Shastri transition was
envisaged as an opportunity to transform India’s strained relationship with the West.
Whilst diﬃcult to gauge its precise impact, British and US intervention in the
succession process, and more especially the promotion of Lal Bahadur Shastri’s
prime-ministerial aspirations, clearly constituted an intrusion into India’s internal
aﬀairs. However, Anglo-American interference in domestic Indian politics,
previously neglected in the historiography of the transfer of power from Nehru to
Shastri, had consequences that extended beyond the early 1960s. The mutual
disaﬀection that came to characterise the interaction between India and the West
during Shastri’s brief premiership, continued to colour Anglo-American perceptions
of Indian foreign policymaking for much of the remainder of the cold war.
In retrospect, it is apparent that the British and US governments misjudged the
eﬀect that the transfer of power from Jawaharlal Nehru to Lal Bahadur Shastri
would have on India’s international relations. Surprisingly, senior Anglo-American
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oﬃcials had no ﬁrst-hand knowledge of the man they championed as Nehru’s
successor. Shastri’s reputation as a moderate and pro-Western ﬁgure was conﬂated
in London and Washington with a willingness on his part to adopt a more
accommodating approach than his predecessor on such thorny issues as Kashmir,
regional security, and colonialism. Prior to 1964, British and US policymakers
exaggerated Jawaharlal Nehru’s signiﬁcance as an impediment to an Indo-Pakistan
rapprochement and the establishment closer ties between India and the West. After
Nehru’s death, they proved equally culpable of misinterpreting Shastri’s willingness
to break new diplomatic ground. The characters and leadership styles of India’s ﬁrst
and second Prime Minister’s diﬀered markedly. The substance of their politics, as
Anglo-American policymakers belatedly came to realise, did not.
Early on 11 January 1966, Lal Bahadur Shastri suﬀered a fatal heart attack. Just
hours before, he had brokered an Indo-Pakistan accord with Ayub Khan in the
Soviet city of Tashkent. The antipathy and discord that bedevilled domestic Indian
politics, and the nation’s relationship with the West under Shastri’s successor, Indira
Gandhi, led policymakers in London and Washington to look back upon his brief
tenure as India’s Prime Minister with rosy nostalgia.154 ‘I am sure,’ Paul Gore-Booth
reﬂected in the early 1970s, ‘that India, Britain and the world could have done with a
little more time with Lal Bahadur Shastri.’155 In fact, it was Jawaharlal Nehru’s
passing, not Shastri’s, that acted as the catalyst for the erosion of Anglo-American
inﬂuence in South Asia. The death of India’s ‘last viceroy’, in May 1964, empowered
a new generation of Indian national leaders unencumbered by the psychological
baggage that had shaped Nehru’s relationship with the West. As Shastri’s presence in
the Soviet Union in January 1966 underscored, in the post-Nehruvian world India’s
foreign policymaking would be based not on past associations, but on existing
political realities.
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